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sporting case study of the implications of publicness  
 
Abstract 
Cutback management is a key theme for public services in an era of austerity, but the 
responsibilities for implementing public funding cutbacks do not always fall upon 
managers employed in the public sector. This article focuses on the cutbacks at third 
sector organisations (TSOs) - three national governing bodies (NGBs) of sport - which 
were affected by UK Sport’s ‘No Compromise’ policy following the 2012 Olympics. 
The article introduces the public funding cutback decision hierarchy as a novel 
framework which is used alongside existing theory to assess the implications of the 
severity and immediacy of cutback. 
Keywords: Sport; cutback; publicness, third sector 
Introduction 
In the era of austerity that followed the 2008 financial crisis, cutback management has re-
emerged as a key theme in the public management literature (Raudla et al. 2015). Despite 
this, there is a paucity of empirical research in this specific type of change management, 
especially on decision-making and the role of ‘public managers’ in cutback (Schmidt, 
Groeneveld, and Van de Walle 2017). In addressing this research gap, it is important to 
undertake research studies of cutback situations occurring in different public settings then 
update knowledge using new case study findings. This paper adds to the evidence base using 
a case study from sports management to inform theory development. The question for this 
paper is ‘how are cutbacks implemented when third sector organisations are responsible for 
making them?’ 
In recent decades, sport has become increasingly drawn into the arena of New Public 




institutional infrastructures have been developed in which National Sport Organisations 
(NSOs) play a key role at both elite and grassroots levels. Performance regimes have been 
developed for elite sports to achieve success at major sporting events (specifically Olympic 
and Paralympic Games) to contribute to public policy goals, including intangibles such as 
‘national pride’ (DCMS/Strategy Unit 2002). As a result, elite Olympic sport is now 
receiving unprecedented levels of public funding, yet the results-focused regime also makes 
such funding less secure (Green 2006, 2008; Green and Houlihan 2006). 
In the UK, the Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) oversees the 
allocation of Exchequer and National Lottery funds to executive non-departmental public 
bodies sport organisations (Greve, Flinders, and Van Thiel 1999): (1) ‘UK Sport’ accountable 
for elite Olympic/Paralympic funding, and; (2) ‘Sport England’, ‘Sport Scotland’, ‘Sport 
Wales’ and ‘Sport Northern Ireland’ accountable for grassroots participation (DCMS 2018). 
In 2016/17, UK Sport received £127m from these sources and Sport England £309m 
(National Audit Office 2017; Sport England 2017; UK Sport 2017). These funds are then 
distributed to the NSOs for each sport, called national governing bodies (NGBs) of sport, 
which are usually third sector organisations (TSOs) legally structured as private companies 
limited by guarantee without share capital (Monzon and Chaves 2008). There are currently 20 
NGBs funded by UK Sport, with allocations for the Olympic cycle leading up to Tokyo 2020 
ranging from £630,000 for Archery, Badminton, Karate and Sport Climbing to £32.5m for 
GB Rowing (UK Sport 2018). When the distinct roles of UK Sport and the four home nation 
distributing bodies emerged in the mid-2000s, most Olympic/Paralympic sports set up a UK-
wide NGB to focus on elite sport, as athletes compete as part of the Great Britain team in the 
Olympics/Paralympics, leaving the home nation NGBs (England, Wales, Scotland, Northern 
Ireland) responsible for grassroots participation. The institutional infrastructure for sport is 




Pandey 2010) because of its reliance on public funding and responsibility for government 
policy. This is the case in frontline NGBs - responsible for each sport – even though they are 
not constitutionally part of the public sector.  
Since 2006, UK Sport has adopted a ‘No Compromise’ policy in allocating funding to 
NGBs, rewarding winners and punishing losers. This strategy not only targets “resources 
solely at those athletes/sports that are capable of delivering medal winning performances” 
(UK Sport 2006, 1) but also enables UK Sport to withdraw funding from those NGBs that fail 
to achieve performance targets when planning for the next Olympic funding cycle (Green 
2009). Therefore, while UK Sport has been able to allocate £265.2m to NGBs for the 2020 
Tokyo Olympic Games (UK Sport 2017), eleven NGBs have now lost all government 
funding for elite athletes since London 2012. Organisations that have lost funding because of 
the ‘No Compromise’ policy make good field sites for empirical research into cutback 
management.  
This case study researches three NGBs who lost part or all their funding after London 
2012 and therefore faced a cutback situation because of severe and immediate funding 
reductions (Jick and Murray 1982; Behn 1983). Each NGB received between £1 and £3m 
from UK Sport in the London Olympics Cycle (2009-2012), employing a small team of core 
staff and contracting out services for other specialist staff to support elite athletes. They all 
lost 90% or more of that funding in the following cycle (2013-2017). The cuts were 
announced in December 2012 and took effect from January 2013, leaving no time for 
adjustment. Thus, the cutbacks required were extreme both in terms of severity and 
immediacy.  
Schmidt, Groeneveld, and Van de Walle (2017) suggest that a change management 
perspective enhances understanding of cutback management by focusing on the roles and 




factor framework for analysis, drawn from the public change management literature, 
incorporating context, content, process, outcomes and leadership. This framework will be 
used to theorise our analysis. The five factors are highlighted in the narrative using italics, so 
they stand out. 
The following section sets out the context to the research by reviewing the literature 
on cutback management and the contextual characteristics of sports governance in the UK. 
This is followed by an outline of methods which includes descriptions of the sampling and 
interview strategies for data collection. After the findings section, the discussion and 
interpretation links the themes and sub-themes from our analysis to Schmidt, Groeneveld, and 
Van de Walle’s (2017) five cutback factors. Then, the wider implications for cutback 
management by TSOs are considered. The final section reviews the theoretical and practical 
contribution of the study, with proposals for further research.  
Cutback management literature and the research context 
The purposes of this section are threefold. First, it briefly reviews the existing literature on 
cutback management highlighting literature gaps and the potential contribution to knowledge 
from our study. Second, it introduces the key theoretical frameworks which inform the 
analysis and interpretation of findings. Finally, it identifies how the discrete characteristics of 
sport affect a cutback situation to contextualise the selected case studies in relation to other 
public management cutback challenges.  
Three literature streams on cutback management have been identified (Cepiku and 
Savignon 2012; Raudla et al. 2015; Schmidt, Groeneveld, and Van de Walle 2017) covering: 
(1) public administration perspectives on cutbacks in the 1970s and early 1980s; (2) 
contemporary public management literature on managing austerity after the global financial 




this study, and in the second literature stream, recent studies have focused on public 
management responses to austerity (Ghin, Hansen, and Kristiansen 2017) and the reform of 
the public sector in response to current challenges (Van de Walle and Groeneveld 2016).  
Studies have identified that the process of public management cutback requires top-
down, centralised budgeting and decision-making (Randma-Liiv and Bouckaert 2016; Raudla 
et al. 2015). However, it also often involves a ‘hierarchy of delegation’ (Ghin, Hansen, and 
Kristiansen 2017, 248) in which centralised target setting is accompanied by decentralised 
powers over implementation. Budgets are set at each stage, but there is typically a measure of 
delegation downwards in terms of how services are prioritised to stay within the reduced 
budget (Randma-Liiv and Bouckaert 2016). When the effects of cutback reach the service 
delivery level, it is often at the end of a series of decisions on resource allocations, taken 
sequentially at different levels and in a hierarchical pattern. However, the focus of recent 
research has typically been on central government policy (Ghin, Hansen, and Kristiansen 
2017; Van de Walle and Groeneveld 2016), and human resource strategies (Esteve et al. 
2017; Kim 2018; Park 2018), with less attention to cutback management on the front line. A 
recent cutback management study which did focus on the service delivery level commented 
on the lack of systematic research at the agency and ‘street level bureaucrat’ level in fiscal 
crisis (Savi and Cepilovs 2017).  
 This hierarchical pattern might be conceptualised holistically as a decision hierarchy 
or, from the perspective of a front-line service being cut back, a decision chain. In the case of 
elite sport in the UK, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport allocates funding to UK 
Sport, which then funds NGBs to run programmes for elite athletes. This decision hierarchy 
crosses institutional boundaries, and, also, a sectoral boundary from public to third sector 
when UK Sport funds an NGB. The transmission of budgetary decisions across 




Van Thiel 2016) because the principal passes responsibility for the next stage in cutback to 
the agent and enforces it. Principal-agent theory is a useful lens for this research because of 
the asymmetric power relationship between UK Sport and the NGBs (Grix and Phillpots 
2011).  
A major literature focus to date has been on the content of cutback strategies, in terms 
of where the cuts fall. Raudla et al. (2015) contrast across-the-board approaches with targeted 
cuts, listing a wide range of terms used to describe these two approaches. Schmidt, 
Groeneveld, and Van de Walle (2017) add a third approach by drawing on the work of Pollitt 
(2010), namely organisational changes aimed at increasing efficiency. This third approach is 
akin to the popular phrase ‘do more with less’ (Hood 1991; Esteve et al. 2017) and efficiency 
is one of the three Es, alongside effectiveness and equity, which have commonly been used 
for assessing the performance of public services (Savas 1978; Andrews and Entwistle 2010). 
The focus of cutback, and the issues to consider under each of these aims, draws from a range 
of different cutback management sources (summarised in Table 1). The three Es act as a 
theoretical framework for analysing the aims and intended outcomes of cutback in our case 
study and relating them to the content of cutback.  
Insert table 1 here 
Sam (2009) explored the characteristics of sport from a public management 
perspective, highlighting key issues for cutback context. He reviewed some recent changes in 
the sector, such as growing government involvement, a move to contractual relationships 
between partners from ‘handouts’ to ‘handshakes’ and encouragement of a more commercial 
approach. These changes are a product of NPM. As a result, he characterised sport policy 
dilemmas as ‘wicked problems’ because they are uncertain, complex and intractable (Sam, 
2009). ‘Wicked problems’ are pervasive across social policy fields (Rittel and Webber, 




other areas of government. 
Table 2 draws on literature about organisational sport management, public 
management, cutback management and turnaround. It suggests that there are some specific 
characteristics of the context within which NGBs operate which will influence their approach 
to cutback and the first of these is the publicness of sport. Application to NGBs is based on 
Bozeman’s (2010) conceptualisation of publicness - the extent to which organisations are 
endowed or constrained by political authority. This characteristic is not unique to sport. 
Under NPM, TSOs, as well as private sector contractors, have had an increasing role in 
delivering public services (Guo and Ho 2018; Park 2018). In undertaking such roles, they 
have increased their publicness (Hood 1991; Randma-Liiv and Bouckaert 2016). While the 
role of TSOs in the delivery of public services has been extensively studied (Macmillan 2010; 
Rees and Mullins 2016), it has been neglected in the cutback literature.  
 
Insert table 2 here 
 
Other characteristics of sport, reported in Table 2, vary in the extent to which they 
provide degrees of uniqueness. Perhaps the most unique characteristics are the networks of 
clubs who organise leagues voluntarily and the attachment of fans to a culture of winning. All 
public services are constrained by policy frameworks, lack of credible alternatives, 
stakeholder diversity and measures of performance (Rainey and Chun 2007), so insights from 
the study of NGBs should have many transferable elements.  
To summarise this section, there is a gap in the cutback management literature at the 
‘sharp end’ of front-line service delivery, so the role of TSOs in these cutback situations has 
been neglected. Therefore, this article will investigate the five factors in cutback management 




decision hierarchy where the responsibility for cutback has been passed to TSOs with a high 
degree of publicness, in the form of NGBs. The analysis of the context of sport suggests that 
empirical research into NGBs may generate insights into public management cutback 
situations beyond sport. 
Method - A case study approach 
Interviews were conducted with individuals in different roles within a purposively selected 
sample of three NGBs affected by the ‘No Compromise’ funding formula. As referred to in 
the Introduction, these NGBs lost all or over 90% of their UK Sport funding. In all three 
cases, the UK Sport funding accounted for over 70% of their total income. This multi-
organisation approach was adopted to enable similarities and differences between NGBs to be 
explored and hence enhance the transferability of research findings to different contexts, both 
within sport and to other fields (Denzin and Lincoln 2005). The constitutional position of the 
three NGBs as TSOs is the focus of our analysis in addressing the research question ‘how are 
cutbacks implemented when third sector organisations are responsible for making them?’ 
Purposive sampling permits the researchers to gather information from sources at the 
heart of the phenomena being researched (Farquhar 2012). To explore the nature and 
consequences of cutback, three types of individual directly involved with the elite programme 
were selected within each NGB (Creswell 2015; Farquhar 2012). The CEO/President (CEO) 
was selected for their central role in decision-making and leadership, performance 
managers/head coach (PM) for their role in implementing cutbacks, and elite athletes (Ath) to 
gauge the impact on those directly affected by decision-making processes. This approach 
allowed an examination of the complexities of roles in stakeholder terms within the NGBs, 
including individuals with different leadership positions and different perspectives on 




Face-to-face semi-structured interviews explored the cutback issues in everyday 
language through questions like ‘Were you expecting the funding reduction when it was 
announced?’ and ‘What decisions did your NGB make in relation to the funding and how did 
it affect you?’ The interviews generated insights into the meanings that individuals ascribed 
to their experience to develop a narrative of what was happening in each organisation 
(Jørgensen and Phillips 2002; Burr 2003), linking initial cutback to the wider turnaround 
effort (Boyne 2004). Each CEO/President and athlete was interviewed three times in the year 
following the implementation of the funding cuts. Performance managers/head coaches were 
interviewed once each. A total of 21 in-depth interviews were conducted by the lead 
researcher between May 2013 and October 2014, with the shortest lasting 55 minutes and the 
longest 115 minutes. Where interviewees were seen more than once, the second and third 
interviews consciously built upon previous discussions. The anonymity of respondents and 
NGBs in this article is maintained to satisfy agreements on confidentiality. 
Interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. Once transcribed, a framework 
was developed through a process of continuous thematic analysis, assisted by NVivo 12, to 
establish and refine a hierarchy of macro-themes, themes and sub-themes within the research 
data. ‘A priori’ macro-themes of retrenchment, reorganisation and repositioning (3Rs), based 
on the wider public service turnaround literature (Author citation; Boyne 2004) were used 
initially to structure the data analysis. However, cutback management emerged inductively as 
an additional macro-theme from this process (Braun and Clarke 2006; Corbin and Strauss 
2015), as much of the data related to cutback as a preliminary process before the ‘3Rs’.  
Findings 
Within the macro-theme of cutback management, the research identified two main themes, 




section. The first theme concerned the severity and immediacy of the cuts affecting the 
Great Britain NGBs, including participants’ reactions to the cuts. The second theme of 
responsibility was linked to the breakdown in communication with the ‘home nation’  NGBs 
responsible for grassroots organising. This breakdown resulted in the collapse of support and 
accountability for the future of the elite pathway in each sport. An overview of the key 
findings of the thematic analysis in relation to cutback management is listed in Table 3, with 
a quotation for each sub-theme as an example of the underpinning evidence. Table 3 also 
indicates the NGBs in which evidence for each sub-theme was identified. This shows that 
NGB2 was less affected than the other two NGBs.  
Insert table 3 here 
Cutback implications – Severity and immediacy  
The consequence of the funding cuts was to make major, immediate ‘efficiency savings’ (see 
Table 1) that reduced costs, balancing expenditure against new income levels to stabilise the 
financial position of the NGB. NGBs were forced by the severity of the cuts to marginalise 
issues of effectiveness (goal orientated) and equity (fairness) to focus on cost-cutting actions 
to maximize savings. Figure 1 applies Raudla et al.’s (2015, 443) categorisation of cutback 
measures to the timeline of key cutback actions by the NGBs during the research period. The 
early cutback decisions focused around reducing programme costs, while decisions that 
focused on capital investment and operational costs were, typically, implemented slightly 
later. Figure 1 also shows that the number of cutback measures undertaken by NGBs 1 and 3 
was greater than those implemented by NGB2. From late 2013 onwards, cutback actions 
were increasingly replaced by retrenchment, reorganisation and repositioning actions, which 
are not included in Figure 1. 




turnaround strategy; decisions were not strategic or cognisant of long-term impacts. For 
example, NGB1 realised that cutting its elite teams had created barriers for talented young 
athletes. As the CEO of NGB1 explained, ‘[we inadvertently created] a glass ceiling for our 
players. Where do they go once they hit the top of their age group?’ Even though there was 
funding to promote youth participation, it became increasingly difficult to attract new athletes as 
there was little opportunity for talented sportsmen and women to transfer to elite senior 
squads. We explore this more fully in the responsibility theme. 
Insert figure 1 here 
All the NGBs were aware of the possibility of funding cuts, but their initial response 
was evidently impaired by a sense of denial that the funding cuts could be so severe, despite 
warnings by UK Sport in the summer of 2012 that some sports might get no funding at all in 
the next four-year cycle.  NGB1 had already begun to put in place cost-saving measures to 
accommodate reductions from £750,000/year on the basis that they would be ‘over the moon 
with £100,000 [per year]’. However, their ‘planning was completely wrong - we got nothing’ 
(NGB1, CEO). Hence, they were forced to undertake drastic, uncoordinated and unplanned 
responses. NGB3 also suffered from this sense of denial as they were hoping for at least 
some funding as they felt that they had achieved their targets and competed with credibility 
(see quote in Table 3). This sense of denial is partly explained by a historically inconsistent 
application of ‘No Compromise’ itself. So, while several NGBs had seen their funding 
reduced in the past, no sport had ever lost all its funding. In the words of the CEO of NGB2:  
All we were asked to do was to compete with credibility. The first indication 
we had was between the games of the Olympics and Paralympics when 
Campbell [Sue] said, “For the first time not all sports should expect to receive 
funding after the games”. 
The severity of the funding cuts shaped CEO responses; decisions were made to 
stabilise their expenses as there was a possibility the NGB could become bankrupt. One of 




amounts of resources in preparation for the Olympics; they held few reserves to manage the 
transition to the 2016 cycle (2013 – 2017). For example, NGB2 undertook an ‘immediate 
readjusting of staffing structures’ and planned to make significant redundancies (NGB2, 
CEO). NGB1 tried to maintain some form of operation by selling their only non-current asset 
but their CEO recognised that this was only a short-term solution and lacked long-term 
sustainability.  
The CEOs noted how the immediacy of the funding cuts forced them to cancel their 
elite programmes and immediately remove financial support for elite athletes regardless of 
ability, level or gender. The CEO for NGB3 explained that the combined severity and 
immediacy of the cuts meant that their organisational response was restricted, shaped by a 
need to respond as quickly as possible. This unplanned, uncommunicated response had a 
significant impact on the elite squad: ‘We’ve lost them. They’ll leave the sport, and they’ll go 
off and do other things. They’re totally disillusioned with sport and the agencies’ (NGB3, 
CEO). 
Paradoxically, these initial deep cuts by CEOs were implemented to keep some 
organisational capacity for their elite pathways (but one which consumed a much lower 
amount of resource). However, while this may have appeared rational in the face of severe 
funding cuts, the CEOs and athletes interviewed acknowledged that the significant cutbacks 
virtually destroyed their sport’s ability to deliver an Olympic programme. The NGB1 CEO 
explained that the severity and immediacy of the cuts meant that the chances of creating a 
new elite pathway were ‘Zero! Imagine any business… having 100% of their funding cut. We 
got £2.3m last time, and we could do certain things, but with zero we can’t do anything’.  
NGBs 1 and 3 cut all elite programmes, but NGB 2 had some residual resources, 
which were used to maintain the core services of the elite programme. While the athletes 




infrastructure, focused on minimal support staff (coaches, performance managers). However, 
the NGB2 athlete viewed what little support they received as ‘tokenistic’, as the financial 
burden of participation in the elite programme had shifted away from the NGB to the athletes, 
the level of support they now received being “Basically nothing, so you have to self-fund 
yourself” (NGB2, Ath). 
 Amongst the athletes across all three sports, there was a strong sub-theme of 
abandonment. The athletes directed communications about these feelings towards their 
NGB’s senior management rather than UK Sport because, ultimately, the funding was 
withdrawn by the NGB. The athletes understood that it was UK Sport who had 
reduced/removed the funding, but the athletes saw the NGBs as the organisations accountable 
for making decisions about implementing the cutbacks and saw a lack of credibility in the 
response. This was especially the case within NGBs 1 and 3 as the cuts were so severe. The 
athletes only looked one level up the cutback decision hierarchy, even if the NGB leaders’ 
choices were severely constrained.  
Responsibilities for the elite programme  
Coinciding with Great Britain NGBs 1 and 3 withdrawing all financial support for their elite 
programmes and athletes, the home nation NGBs (e.g. at England level) made the strategic 
decision to not assume any responsibility for senior elite programmes. The home nation 
NGBs had significant resources for elite junior programmes, but Sport England would only 
allow the money to be spent on their own priority area of talented/elite junior athletes (Green 
and Houlihan, 2004). The CEO for NGB3 noted that this ring-fencing of money had always 
been in place, nevertheless, the restrictions had become tighter, placing significant constraints 
on all the operational activities of the NGB. However, without a senior elite team, the 




address this longer-term issue. 
It became apparent that this decision not to champion the elite senior programme was 
due not only to ring-fencing of funding but also to differing organisational objectives and a 
lack of communication between the Great Britain and home nation NGBs. A performance 
manager pointed to a communication breakdown during the implementation of the cuts, 
noting that although the sport had begun to put in place the knowledge, skills and learning 
developed over the previous five years, ‘where people feel let down is the [lack of] 
communication’ (NGB3, PM). They argued that the cuts created an assumption within both 
parties that the elite programme was not their responsibility. Better communication of roles and 
responsibilities was essential to understand the implications: ‘I don’t know if they 
communicated between themselves in terms of really understanding removing funding from 
elite senior programmes that [sport] would be almost blank, that part of the pyramid is now 
completely blank and that has implications.’ (NGB3, PM). The CEO of NGB 3 explained that 
the Great Britain NGB had no funding and hence no programme, but might be able to 
compete as England as the resource requirements were much lower. However, the CEO went 
on to state: 
It’s just a big elephant sat in the corner of the room that we’re trying to keep 
something going but who pays for it, how messy does it become, are you 
sharing that? Are we sharing this? Actually, we still can’t compete. 
The views of the athletes from both NGB1 and NGB3 support the sub-theme of a lack 
of communication - both were kept in the dark the about critical cutback decisions that 
affected them. The lack of information regarding the elite programme, and the decision-
making process behind these actions, meant the athletes felt the cutback decisions lacked 
transparency. There was a lack of consultation with the athletes from their respective NGBs, 
ranging from them not being party to discussions on the implications of funding reductions to 




communication streams intact, the athlete felt the approach was didactic and that they were 
unable to challenge the cutback decisions of senior management, as the organisation was 
facing such a difficult financial situation. The athletes argued that they had been burdened 
with all the hardships of training for the Olympics Games (some had over £4,000 of debt) and 
were tied to their sport while staff in paid employment could leave their NGBs and move to 
other sports. The athletes felt the lack of communication so keenly because of their 
vulnerability:  
People who are in charge are in charge of your destiny. So, I can understand 
it if I was putting the money in myself and we did for the most part. We were 
keeping the roof over our own heads while we were away in Denmark, 
Austria and whatever else. We would like to know what their plans are for 
us and what targets they were setting us, where they are sending us - we 
simply weren’t told anything! (NGB3, Ath)  
The home nations were restricted by inflexible funding, but many of the athletes 
perceived the cutbacks and their consequences as being related to past differences and 
conflicts between Great Britain and home nation NGBs. While all the NGBs were restricted 
in their actions by the ring-fenced nature of their funding, NGB2 was less exposed, as they 
were eligible to participate at the Commonwealth Games and therefore able to draw down 
limited additional funding. This is one of the reasons that NGB2 implemented fewer cutback 
actions than NGBs 1 and 3. 
The athletes and one of the performance managers remarked that, even before the 
cutbacks, there was little or no cooperation between the home nations and the Great Britain 
NGB (see quote in Table 3). The CEOs interviewed took a more pragmatic view, with one 
CEO reporting, ‘I won’t say that they have washed their hands of us as that would be a bit 
unkind’ (NGB3, CEO). They argued that the home nations were heavily restricted due to 
inflexible funding and had to meet specific targets and KPIs: ‘[Even if] they wanted to help, 




acting in a ‘rational’ manner because diverting funds to elite programmes would risk 
underachieving on their other targets. Such goal rigidity drove short-term operational 
behaviour that sought to protect resources and key stakeholders but put in jeopardy the long-
term goals of the sport.  
Reflections on cutback  
The two cutback themes articulate the central problems faced by the NGBs. Firstly, owing to 
the severity and immediacy of the funding reductions, the cutback actions of the 
organisations influenced (and placed restrictions on) decisions they were able to make later in 
their turnaround strategies. Secondly, NGBs linked to the Olympic/Paralympic Games 
operate within a structure that does not support home nations taking responsibility for elite 
programmes, due to inflexible funding streams and antagonistic stakeholder relationships. 
The severity of the cuts, coupled with their immediacy, meant it was almost impossible for 
NGBs to understand, analyse and evaluate the scope of the problem they faced. This meant 
that it was difficult to create coherency within their actions, resulting in cutback management 
actions that were focused on short-term cost-cutting on operations, not strategic intentions. 
This inadvertently hampered the NGBs’ ability to plan for the long-term future of their elite 
programmes. 
Discussion and interpretation of cutback in NGBs 
This section interprets the findings from the previous section using the theoretical 
perspectives introduced in the literature review, with the intention of identifying new insights 
which differ from, or deepen understanding of, existing knowledge. The first two columns of 
Table 4 link the cutback sub-themes in our study to the five cutback factors of Schmidt, 




Insert table 4 here 
The key characteristics of our cases in terms of context were the draconian nature of 
‘No Compromise’ and inflexibilities in the use of funds, which led to extreme cutback with 
high severity (content) and immediacy (process). Severity and immediacy have been used 
before to categorise cutback crises, with Jick and Murray (1982) labelling crises combining 
high severity and short-term time pressures as ‘Big Bomb’ unanticipated major cuts. Since 
then, there has been little research conducted that examines the combined implications of 
these factors within organisations with high levels of publicness (Levine 1979; Greenhalgh, 
McKersie and Gilkey 1986). To some degree, this may reflect the nature of public sector 
budgeting, with cutbacks occurring in several different rounds, rather than as one-off actions 
(Raudla et al. 2015). The usual pattern is that when fiscal stress becomes severe, after several 
years of cuts, it is more likely that across-the-board reductions will be replaced by targeted 
cuts. The NGBs briefly attempted targeted cuts but then moved to a broader-based approach, 
based on cost-cutting across all operations.  The notable exception to this was NGB2, where 
targeting was more feasible,  because they had a slightly better residual resource base than the 
other NGBs. These differences between NGBs illustrate how in very extreme cutback 
situations the content of cutback is necessarily felt across-the-board. For NGBs 1 and 3, a 
focus on the survival of the organisation through sweeping short-term efficiencies led to a 
neglect of effectiveness and equity considerations. 
In terms of process, the broad-based approach was not the result of a carefully 
thought through strategy. The suddenness of the cuts meant that NGBs could not spend time 
understanding, analysing or evaluating problems regarding future targets (Finkin 1992; 
Barker and Duhaime 1997; Walshe et al. 2004). Therefore, the immediate cutback actions 
concentrated on stabilising the financial position rather than understanding long-term 




funding model). This is consistent with the little research that has been conducted that 
examines the immediacy of funding cuts, with Schick’s (2010) observation that any action 
undertaken by an organisation to respond to immediate financial distress will be ‘ad hoc’ or 
‘improvised’ in its execution. 
 The literature on the leadership of cutback has highlighted the importance of 
relationships, whether that be in terms of employee participation (Schmidt, Groeneveld and 
Van deWalle 2017), aligned values (Esteve et al. 2017) or attitudes to clients amongst street 
level bureaucrats (Savi and Cepilovs 2017). In the case of the NGBs, denial and lack of 
responsibility can be identified in the behaviour of leaders, together with a lack of co-
operation between the Great Britain and home nation NGBs. Amongst athletes, there were 
feelings of abandonment and a view that the NGB response lacked credibility – which 
combined to undermine the relationship with the NGB leaders. These shortcomings in 
leadership behaviours can be interpreted using the ‘coping cycle’ from change management 
theory (Carnall and By 2014) in which an early sequence of immobilisation, denial and 
depression hampers the ability to respond effectively to a crisis. ‘Denial and delay’ is also a 
recognised response to fiscal stress in the public cutback management literature, albeit often 
associated with less severe budget reductions (Kim 2018). In this study, the problems of 
denial and lack of responsibility were heightened by ambiguities in the roles of Great Britain 
and home nation NGBs. The home nations wanted to protect their own programmes and were 
reluctant to get involved, ‘passing the buck’ for accountability and responsibility (Bovens 
2005). This reflects a common theme in cutback practices, to focus narrowly on activities for 
which there is direct accountability, reducing opportunities for collaborative activities to help 
service users transfer between organisations (Peters, Pierre, and Randma-Liiv 2011).  
The nature of the relationship between UK Sport and the NGBs can be described as a 




at the expense of the agent, and the principal can enforce the budget cuts for which the agent 
is responsible. There was an attempt by the NGBs at ‘ex-post haggling’ (Van Thiel 2016, 34), 
but this was ineffective because it posed little threat to UK Sport itself. The NGBs were in a 
position of weakness which meant that the main outcome from the cutback stage was: (1) 
path dependency towards a less effective role in supporting elite sport, and; (2) decisions that 
constrained options for a future turnaround effort. In turn, these reduced the likelihood of 
regaining UK Sport funding. The slightly less severe reduction in resources for NGB2 
provided more opportunities for targeting the cuts and retaining some support for elite 
athletes, highlighting the significance of the other funding source available to NGB2, in a 
crisis situation where quick decisions had to be made. 
Although not public-sector bodies in constitutional (legal) terms, NGBs are subject to 
the paradoxes of publicness (Pandey 2010) which were magnified in this extreme cutback 
situation. In relation to the first paradox regarding organisational goals, the loss of UK Sport 
funding left the NGBs with a long-term near-impossible challenge (to re-establish a credible 
possibility that podium positions could be achieved) if they were to regain UK Sport funding. 
This sat alongside a host of other goals, some linked to the second paradox of publicness, to 
keep employees, volunteers and other stakeholders engaged in their sport. They faced the 
difficulty highlighted by Pandey (2010) of a trade-off between short- and long-term goals. 
With regard to the final paradox of publicness, the role of the NGBs illustrates the issue 
highlighted by Pandey (2010) of performance for public-funded activity being the 
responsibility of organisations from different sectors. Within this context, NGBs might be 
regarded as victims of a performance management system which held them accountable for 
targets over which they had very tenuous influence, with performance in Olympic Games 




the elite athletes, a finding that parallels Savi and Cepilov’s (2017) study of street level 
bureaucrats in Estonia and Latvia who were also blamed for centrally-imposed cuts. 
This section of the article has demonstrated how the experiences of the NGBs 
can be related to the five factors in cutback from a change management perspective 
(Schmidt, Groeneveld, and Van de Walle 2017) and to the paradoxes of publicness in 
cutback management (Pandey 2010). The evident differences between NGB2 and the 
other NGBs are related to the marginally less severe and immediate cutbacks required. 
 
Cutback management by TSOs 
Discussion in this section is addressed directly to the research question ‘how are cutbacks 
implemented when third sector organisations are responsible for making them? We consider 
how the case study from sports management can generate insights into the wider issue of 
cutback management by TSOs in situations with a high degree of publicness. Key challenges 
for TSOs, based on our findings, are summarised in the final column of Table 4, linked to the 
five cutback factors (Schmidt, Groeneveld, and Van de Walle 2017). 
In the UK, the role of TSOs in delivering public services has been increasing 
(MacMillan 2010; Rees and Mullins 2016) and this is also part of a wider international trend 
associated with co-production and NPM (Pestoff, Brandsen, and Verschuere 2012) as well as 
the wider impact of austerity (Ghin, Hansen, and Kristiansen 2017; Esteve et al. 2017). 
Therefore, instances, where TSOs are responsible for cutbacks to publicly funded front-line 
services, are becoming more common yet remain under-researched. It is within this context 
that we position our contribution.  
We found that the NGBs, as front-line service deliverers, were at the end of a 




for TSOs. Firstly, NGBs have little power in their principal-agent relationship with state 
bodies unless they have alternative sources of finance. UK Sport determined the content of 
the cuts and imposed them, and only NGB2 was able to continue any support for elite 
athletes.  
Secondly, the NGBs were so remote from the decision-making process, they could not 
challenge it. They were uncertain over the magnitude of the cuts and planned on the basis that 
there was no precedent for a total cutback in funding. Their view on the eventual funding 
allocations was that ‘No Compromise’ was inconsistently applied, to their detriment, but they 
had no power to challenge UK Sport. Upon receiving the decision from UK Sport there was 
extremely limited time to implement the cutbacks, so immediacy was high. Issues of 
asymmetrical power relationships and remoteness from decision-making processes are likely 
to be experienced by other TSOs delivering public services.  
Thirdly, the sporting case study used has identified noteworthy challenges for 
leadership in addressing the cutback challenges. Some of the issues are context specific, such 
as the complexities of the relationships between Great Britain and home nation NGBs, yet 
other findings are more relevant to other TSOs. For example, the finding that service users 
blamed the NGB leadership more than organisations higher up the cutback decision hierarchy 
is one which is consistent with the focus of blame falling on local service deliverers as found 
by Savi and Cepilovs (2017). TSO leaders may have to bear the brunt of the blame for cuts 
imposed from above. 
Lastly, the combination of context, content, process and leadership factors in our case 
study led to outcomes from cutback which constrained future options. This leads to path 
dependency which negatively affects TSOs ability to recover from a cutback situation. We 
suggest that other TSOs may face similar challenges in managing cutbacks so they need to 




Practical and theoretical contribution, and further research 
The previous section has highlighted findings from our study which are relevant to TSOs 
facing cutback challenges, yet our results also have direct relevance within sports 
management. The ‘No Compromise’ funding framework remains an important topic, and at 
the heart of the decision-making process for how resources are allocated by UK Sport, so 
other NGBs may face similar severe cuts in the future. With NSOs in other countries subject 
to similar performance management regimes (Sam and Macris 2014), the findings are 
internationally relevant, given our analysis of the intricate links between elite and grassroots 
sport funding regimes, and also the management of organisational boundaries and restrictions 
in a cutback situation.  
We have utilised a change management perspective on cutback based on Schmidt, 
Groeneveld, and Van de Walle’s (2017) five-factor framework. Within that framework, we 
have also drawn on and extended the application of theories from three areas, namely: 
• Cutback management theory, such as the severity/time model of Jick and Murray 
(1982),  
• Public management theory, such as the principal-agent relationship between 
public bodies and TSOs (Van Thiel 2016), and  
• Change management theory, such as the ‘coping cycle’ (Carnall and By 2014).  
The article has made a theoretical contribution with the focus on the service delivery 
end of the cutback decision hierarchy, enabling analysis of the role of TSOs in this position. 
The decision hierarchy could be applied more generally to track the timing and severity of 
cutback, using the five-factor framework (Schmidt, Groeneveld, and Van de Walle 2017) at 
different levels in the hierarchy. This would reveal the sequence of cutback strategies in any 
given context. For example, in our research, the highly targeted cutbacks imposed by UK 




cutback decision hierarchy could also be used to further investigate perceptions of 
accountability for imposed cutbacks, building on the findings of our study and Savi and 
Cepilovs (2017). 
 In future research, it is worth exploring situations where, like the NGBs, other TSOs 
delivering public services will be subject to cutback challenges. It is worth investigating their 
strategies for addressing these challenges, with the potential to stimulate productive debate 
amongst TSOs. Our case study may represent an example at the extreme end of a continuum 
in the severity and immediacy of cutback; hence other TSOs may have addressed less drastic 
situations in very different ways. Future research might also explore the cutback actions of 
private sector contractors delivering services in situations with a high degree of publicness, to 
enable further inter-sectoral comparisons. Finally, there will be examples of cutback 
challenges for cross-sectoral partnerships, perhaps arising from co-creation and co-production 
of services, where research may identify different cutback strategies. 
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Table 1. Cutback Management Concepts 
Concept Aim of cut-back Possible effects  
Efficiency • Cost savings 
o Cuts are focused on the areas 
where maximum savings can 
be achieved 
• Long-term organisational 
effectiveness put at risk 
• Conflict throughout the 
organisation 
Effectiveness • Goal attainment 
o Re-distribution of resources 
to achieve priority goals 
• Powerful stakeholder(s) may 
dominate, with a short-term focus 
on appeasing them 
• Trade-offs are not considered 
Equity • Fairness 
o Cuts are equally applied to 
all areas of the organisation, 
to create a sense of ‘sharing 
the burden’ 
• Trade-offs are ignored to build 
consensus  
• Short-term focus, based on 
consensus 




Table 2. Characteristics of NGBs that may impact the cutback effort 
Characteristic Contextual implications for cutback 
Publicness 
• A resource dependent relationship that exists between NGBs and funding agencies. Several NGBs receive over 80% of their total 
income from UK Sport and Sport England.  
• Funding from agencies is heavily ring-fenced, which means the funds have restrictions placed on them so that it can only be used 
for a particular purpose.  This means it cannot be allocated as the NGB might wish – it creates a lack of organisational flexibility.  
• NGBs have less control over their own mission and objectives. 
Cutback may be more difficult to achieve due to restrictions on 
managerial autonomy and lack of organisational flexibility related 
to NPM. 
Policy framework of sport 
• ‘No Compromise’ can be seen as ineffectual as a mechanism to identify and halt decline as it generally provides a means of 
accountability rather than a measure of performance improvement. 
• Milestone targets provide an annual review of performance, but they promote accountability rather than performance 
improvement. NGBs have lost significant amounts of funding through these annual reviews. 
• Monitoring and review processes do not help the NGBs to identify 
which areas to cutback within the organisation before the funding 
is removed. 
Credibility of alternatives 
• Sports do not have credible alternatives to the incumbent NGBs no matter how badly they perform.  
• Stakeholders (players, coaches, volunteers) can either continue to engage with the poorly performing NGB or leave the sport 
entirely – their options are severely limited. 
• Once funding is withdrawn, there might be little incentive/support 
to improve performance levels. 
• NGBs could potentially exist as ‘permanent failures’. 
Diversity of stakeholders 
• Stakeholders exhibit different and complex wants and expectations that may enable (but could also inhibit) cutback efforts. 
• Stakeholders may hold resources needed to improve performance and may seek to influence decisions. 
• Stakeholders will place different levels of importance on different 
criteria when deciding what services to eliminate. 
• Issues of power and negotiation. 
Elite, grassroot, mass participation, leagues and clubs 
• Sport in the UK has a high dependency on voluntary sports clubs to implement policies concerned with grassroots, mass 
participation and elite sport. 
• Most sports within the UK have different NGBs for their elite and grassroot participation. These are separate entities which creates 
a lack of strategic planning within the sport development pathway.  
• Working in partnerships leads to compromises over objectives 
due to power relationships between NGBs and sport clubs.  
• NGBs may be impeded/supported in their cutback efforts due to 
their increased reliance on sports clubs.  
 
Culture and values 
• Winning, and an ability to win, is a central value in elite sport and it is the principal measure of performance. 
• When implementing cutbacks, NGB maybe forced to make paid, professional staff redundant. 
• Once professional staff leave the organisation, NGBs may begin to revert to the original structure and operations they adopted 
before they received increased funding. 
• The professionalism that underpins NGBs operations may be 
eroded as cuts are enacted, resulting in an inability to draw/attract 
further funding. 
Measurement of performance 
• A move away from rewarding outputs to funding outcomes and achievements. 
• Traditional norms and values of mass participation that drove performance within NGBs have been deprioritised compared to elite 
sport and the winning of medals. 
• An incapacity to fund elite athletes will result in an inability to 
meet future targets. NGBs are unlikely to be able to access funding 
in the short-term. 
Sources: Meyer and Zucker 1989; Slack and Hinings 1992; Amis, Slack, and Hinings 2004; Smith 2004; Nichols et al. 2005; Pajunen 2006; 




Table 3. Themes and key quotes of cutback 








• Cutback is financially orientated and 
lacks strategic planning. 
'I think it was just a case of the money has run out, nobody is employed anymore, you know the lights weren’t turned up, the door was locked and 
that was it and there was no real will or inclination to, you know, in other words, no one was responsible. There was no programme; there was no 
team.' (NGB 1, Ath) 




• CEOs felt they would get at least 
some funding no matter what their 
performance. 
'We were hoping to get something like £350,000 / maximum £400,000 over 4 years. I mean really, it is not a huge amount out of the budget… But 
to get nothing has given us a real problem.' (NGB 3, CEO) 
NGB 1  
NGB 2 
NGB 3 
 Inconsistent application of ‘No 
Compromise’ 
• Some sports did not achieve targets 
and yet saw funding increases 
Referring to other NGBs who did not meet their targets but retained their funding: 
'In my opinion, if UK Sport are going to be true to their word, they should have their funding cut because they failed to meet their targets, and it 
is not a difficult target with the amount of money that they have invested in them.' (NGB 3, CEO) 
NGB 1  
NGB 3 
 Severity 
• Severe cuts lack planned solutions 
‘How bad is it having to tell our performance director that “by the way, after the games, we are making you redundant.” The players were up in 
arms.' (NGB 1, CEO) 
NGB 1  
NGB 3 
 Immediacy 
• Immediate cuts lack planned 
solutions 
‘There was an immediate readjustment of our whole staffing structure and budget going forward. This was targeted at staff on the Olympic 
programme because we don’t have the budget to support that.' (NGB 2, CEO) 
NGB 1  
NGB 3 
 Abandonment 
• Athletes suffered disproportionately 
from  the cutbacks 
‘If you make this decision [to terminate the elite programme] without even consulting like me as the captain or the squad in general 
then you’ll be you know you’ll be sort of disengaging this group of players that have delivered so much!' (NGB 1, Ath) 
NGB 1  
NGB 3 
 Lack of credibility of response 
• Athletes needed to see believable 
credibility in actions, not tokenism  
'The programme now lacks the professionalism we had before the funding cut. From the Olympics those 12 guys that played as a team, have all 
this knowledge, played at the highest for 5 years and in most cases were mid-twenties and not even at their peak, there are probably only 2 guys 
still playing professionally.’ (NGB 3, Ath) 
NGB 1  
NGB 3 
Responsibilities 
for the elite 
programme 
Lack of responsibility 
• Home nation NGB avoided taking 
responsibility 
'There was no support from the home nations. They felt they didn't have to commit anything financially because they had no responsibility towards 
the programme, so they didn't really put any support behind the team which seemed ridiculous.' (NGB 3, Ath) 
NGB 1  
NGB 2 
NGB 3 
 Lack of communication 
• Cutbacks cause a breakdown in 
communication 
‘You would have thought somebody at least would have taken it upon themselves to say, “ok guys this is a bit of a shit situation. Here are the 
facts, we can’t really do much about this at the moment, (inaudible), you are on your own but you know to get in touch and we will support you 
in the best way we can,” but no one did that.’ (NGB 3, Ath) 
NGB 1  
NGB 3 
 Lack of cooperation 
• A lack of cooperation and 
coordination 
'They never ever worked together. I mean in the five years that we were with the British team never once did they work together, not what I could 
see anyway. There was no coordination, there was no knowledge sharing across the two organisations.' (NGB 3, Ath) 
NGB 1  
NGB 2 
NGB 3 
 Inflexible funding 
• Cutbacks focused on elite as Sport 
England funding heavily ring-fenced 
'They had a federation up until a few years ago, so they are quite behind and then [named sport] England is doing nothing at an elite senior level. 
At sort of talented/elite junior level, so I would call that under 21 and below they are still putting up teams because those teams I think they are 
justifying funding through Sport England grants' (NGB 3, Ath) 




• Cutback focuses on operational 
issues 
'It was more volunteer-based, and they didn’t make decisions that were [at a] high level and were more focused on operational issues, rather than 
the long-term development of the sport.' (NGB 2, Ath) 







Table 4. Summary of cutback themes and challenges for TSO’s, related to the cutback 
management framework (Schmidt et al. 2017) 
Cutback factor Cutback sub-themes from 
our study 
Challenges for TSOs in public service 
cutback management 
Context • Inconsistent application 
of ‘No Compromise’ 
• Inflexible funding 
• Other characteristics of 
NGBs from Table 2 
• TSOs are often delivering frontline 
public services, at the end of a 
hierarchical cutback decision chain, 
which is subject to policies over which 
the TSOs have little or no control 
Content • Cost-cutting 
• Severity 
• Operations  
• TSOs are likely to have targeted cuts 
inflicted on them, because of 
asymmetric principal-agency power 
relationships 
Process • Immediacy 
• Lack of communication 
• TSOs may be late to find out the 
magnitude of the cuts because they are 
isolated from decision-making 
processes 
Leadership • Denial 
• Abandonment 
• Lack of responsibility 
• Lack of credibility of 
response 
• Lack of cooperation 
• Beneficiaries of services blame cuts on 
TSOs as delivery agencies, rather than 
the organisations imposing cuts higher 
up the cutback decision hierarchy 
Outcomes • Path dependency • Cutback actions which leave options 
open for a longer-term turnaround are 





Source: Key adapted from Raudla et al. (2015, 443)  
Figure 1 - Timeline of cutback actions 
 
